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Abstract—Privacy research is attracting increasingly more
attention, especially with the upcoming general data protection
regulation (GDPR) which will impose stricter rules on storing and
managing personally identifiable information (PII) in Europe. For
vehicle manufacturers, gathering data from connected vehicles
presents new analytic opportunities, but if the data also contains
PII, the data comes at a higher price when it must either be
properly de-identified or gathered with contracted consent from
the drivers.
One option is to establish contracts with every driver, but
the more tempting alternative is to simply de-identify data
before it is gathered, to avoid handling PII altogether. However,
several real-world examples have previously shown cases where
re-identification of supposedly anonymized data was possible,
and it has also been pointed out that PII has no technical
meaning. Additionally, in some cases the manufacturer might
want to release statistics either publicly or to an original
equipment manufacturer (OEM). Given the challenges with
properly de-identifying data, structured methods for performing
de-identification should be used, rather than arbitrary removal
of attributes believed to be sensitive.
A promising research area to help mitigate the re-identification
problem is differential privacy, a privacy model that unlike most
privacy models gives mathematically rigorous privacy guarantees.
Although the research interest is large, the amount of real-world
implementations is still small, since understanding differential
privacy and being able to implement it correctly is not trivial.
Therefore, in this position paper, we set out to answer the
questions of how and when to use differential privacy in the
automotive industry, in order to bridge the gap between theory
and practice. Furthermore, we elaborate on the challenges
of using differential privacy in the automotive industry, and
conclude with our recommendations for moving forward.
I. INTRODUCTION
The ability to collect data from modern connected vehicles
presents opportunities for increased analysis, which enables
vehicle manufacturers to both improve existing as well as
develop new services. For example, investigating driving be-
haviour would make it possible to learn more about the drivers’
needs and preferences, allowing manufacturers to better cater
to customers’ needs. Especially, using machine learning on
large data sets could result in interesting correlations that were
previously unknown.
However, gathering data from vehicles is not only an
opportunity for further analysis, but also a possible privacy risk
to the individual drivers. A recent survey show that drivers’
privacy concerns include disclosure of private information, car
vehicle tracking and commercial use of their personal data [1].
Seeing as privacy is a concern for drivers when it comes to
connected vehicles, the problem needs to be addressed by the
manufacturers in order to maintain the drivers’ trust. Moreover,
the upcoming general data protection regulation (GDPR) [2]
will soon enforce stricter handling of personally identifiable
information (PII). Failure to comply with the GDPR may
result in fines of up to either e20,000,000 or 4% of the total
worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial year [2].
Even though the GDPR is a European law, it will affect all
companies that sell vehicles to Europe, as this is where the data
will be collected. It is therefore important that PII is handled
with care in order to protect the company’s brand, maintain
the customers’ trust as well as to meet the new legislation.
A common pitfall when de-identifying data is to only
remove attributes than can obviously be classified as
PII, such as VIN numbers. However, as pointed out by
Narayanan and Shmatikov [3], defining and identifying PII is
surprisingly difficult, and in fact, PII has no technical meaning.
A vehicle has approximately 7700 unique signals [4], and
while these signals may seem to be separate from PII, even
observing a driver’s behaviour for as short as 15 minutes is
enough to fingerprint and identify a driver with high accu-
racy [5]. Furthermore, Gao et al. [6] showed that the driving
speed in combination with an external road map is enough
to trace the location of a vehicle with high accuracy, even
though GPS data has been removed. In addition, Tockar [7]
demonstrated that an “anonymized” version of NYC cab data,
in combination with public data, contained enough informa-
tion to track celebrities and identify passengers that visited
sensitive locations in the city. Thus, all data should be treated
as PII, since auxiliary data might be available to re-identify
individuals. For example, the position of the car seat might not
seem to be PII, but it is likely enough to distinguish between
two drivers of the same car.
A promising privacy model with rigorous, mathematical
privacy guarantees that could solve the previously mentioned
problems is differential privacy [8], [9]. Intuitively, for an
individual, the best privacy is achieved by not participating
in a survey, as their data will not affect any statistics released
from such a survey. Consequently, differential privacy aims
to approximate one individual not being in the data set. Fur-
thermore, differential privacy’s privacy guarantees are robust
and does not change over time, as it is backward and forward
proof. That is, any current or future data set cannot affect the
privacy guarantees offered by differential privacy.
As claimed by Dwork, differential privacy is able to pro-
vide high utility, accuracy, as well as high privacy in many
cases [9]. This is a very desirable property, as there exists a
trade-off between privacy and utility that is difficult to balance.
Intuitively, this trade-off can be explained by investigating two
extreme cases. Without utility, privacy makes little sense, as
privacy without utility is satisfied when no data is gathered.
However, full utility is achieved by publishing a raw data set,
which does not give any privacy guarantees. As neither of
these two cases are desirable, a trade-off between the two must
be made.
While differential privacy shows promise, it can be chal-
lenging to use in real-world cases, as the utility is affected
by different parameters. The most prominent real-world cases
that use differential privacy have been presented by large
companies, such as Apple [10] and Google [11], and only
cover very limited use cases. In particular, for vehicular data,
differential privacy has so far only been investigated for
floating car data (FCD) [12]. Since differential privacy has
not yet been established in the automotive domain, although
there is a need for privacy-preserving analyses, we believe that
differential privacy is a future trend that this paper will aid in
paving the way forward for. Hence, the contribution of this
position paper is a comprehensible introduction to differential
privacy (Section II, III and IV), where we investigate what
type of differentially private analyses can be performed in the
vehicular domain from a holistic perspective, not only for one
specific data type. Furthermore, we provide recommendations
(Section V) for how to proceed when implementing differen-
tially private analyses in the vehicle domain, and highlight the
challenges (Section VI) involved with the implementation.
II. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
Differential privacy originates from statistical research and
examples used often include queries on databases. It is impor-
tant to note that differential privacy is designed to suit statis-
tical queries that make predictions for large populations, as it
prevents inference of information about an entity. As has been
pointed out, any meaningful privacy guarantees for differential
privacy are not achievable when specific individuals in a data
set should be identified [13]. For example, differential privacy
will not return any useful information when we ask if Bob
uses his company car on weekends.
The differential privacy definition, shown in Definition 1 [9],
states that when the same query is run on two neighboring
data sets, differing in at most one element, the difference
between the probability of getting the same outcome of both
queries is essentially negligible. In other words, the presence
or absence of one single record does not affect the outcome
of a query noticeably. Intuitively, the idea behind differential
privacy is to produce a result to a statistical query that is
almost indistinguishable whether or not one record is present
or absent in the data set.
Definition 1 (ǫ-differential privacy): A randomized function
K gives ǫ-differential privacy if for all data sets D1 and D2
differing on at most one element, and all S ⊆ Range(K),
P r[K(D1) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ǫ)× Pr[K(D2) ∈ S]
Two of the main properties of differential privacy are
query composability and post-processing of data [14]. Being
composable means that any results of differentially private
analyses can be combined, in which case privacy degrades ad-
ditively. Composability also allows several queries to target the
same data. Other privacy models, such as k-anonymity [15],
fails under composition [16], even with itself. Lastly, any
post-processing conducted on data released under differential
privacy can be included in any additional analyses, without
increased risk to an entity [13].
The risk incurred on an individual is monitored by ǫ, which
is sometimes also referred to as the privacy guarantee. When
ǫ is set to a low value, it gives higher privacy at the cost of
reduced utility, whereas a high ǫ gives lower privacy and higher
utility. Thus, setting ǫ appropriately is a trade-off between
utility and privacy and should be carried out by an expert
in the domain.
Another parameter involved is the privacy budget, which is
a global parameter from which ǫ is deducted when a query is
run. The privacy budget is being consumed by querying the
database in order to maintain privacy, and the more queries the
higher noise the answers receive. This response can intuitively
be explained by an example including the game of twenty
questions. In the game of twenty questions, the more questions
that are answered, the closer the contestants get to the real
answer. To counteract anyone from finding the real answer
under differential privacy, the privacy budget enforces that
each consecutive answer gets more vague. When the privacy
budget is depleted, ǫ can only be set to zero, which means
answers will no longer return any meaningful information
about the data.
There are many different ways of achieving differential
privacy, as any function K that fulfills Definition 1 is differ-
entially private. The reason for why there are many different
algorithms is that they are data dependent, and the utility
from a differentially private algorithm changes depending on
its input data [17]. Consequently, researchers are constantly
inventing new algorithms that are optimized for their analysis,
resulting in a vast number of differentially private algorithms
with varying complexity and utility.
III. RELEASE MECHANISMS
The basic idea of a release mechanism, K from Definition 1,
is to add probabilistic noise to the real query result. Different
release mechanisms are better suited for different data types,
such as numerical or categorical data. The lower bound of
the accuracy of each release mechanism can also be proven
mathematically in order to determine which mechanism is
most likely to yield high utility.
Release mechanisms can also be deployed in two different
modes: centralized or local. In the centralized mode differen-
tial privacy is guaranteed by a trusted party, usually at the time
when the database is queried. For local differential privacy on
the other hand, each data point is collected under differential
privacy in a distributed manner, meaning that noise is added lo-
cally. In this section we will describe the Laplace mechanism,
the exponential mechanism and randomized response. Figure I
shows an overview of the mechanisms and their respective
characteristics.
Mechanism Name Deployment Mode Answer Data Type











TABLE I: Comparison between the characteristics of three
common differentially private mechanisms
A. The Laplace Mechanism
The Laplace mechanism, illustrated in Figure 1, works
by adding controlled numerical noise drawn from a Laplace
distribution to a query answer. To be able to hide changes in
the data set, the query sensitivity, ∆f , in combination with
the privacy budget, ǫ, is used when generating the noise. The
query sensitivity is the maximum impact removing or adding




query differentially private result
Fig. 1: An illustration of a database with a Laplace mechanism
that is used to release differentially private query answers
Since the Laplace mechanism produces continuous numer-
ical noise, it is suitable for queries that are also numerical.
Queries can be either continuous or discrete, as differential
privacy allows post-processing. In case of a discrete query,
the output will be continuous, but can be rounded up to a
discrete value without violating differential privacy.
The Laplace mechanism is applied centrally by a trusted
party. Thus, all raw data is kept in a database off-board, where
each query result is released under differential privacy.
B. Exponential Mechanism
The exponential mechanism [18] is designed for categorical
data, so the added noise is not numerical. Rather, the analyst
provides a utility function that specifies the distance between
the different categories. For example, the analyst might want to
specify the distance between colors, where shades of the same
color are closer than a different color. The exponential mech-
anism then uses the utility function to output a good answer
to the query with higher probability than outputting an answer
further from the truth. Thus, the exponential mechanism favors
answers that have high utility for a given query input. Like
the Laplace mechanism, the exponential mechanism is also
applied centrally.
C. Randomized Response
Randomized response [19] was originally invented in 1965
to estimate the amount of people in the population that
belong to a sensitive group. Since membership of the group
is sensitive, the respondent has an incentive to lie if he or she
is part of the group, which can cause a skewed distribution of
answers. Therefore, randomized response provides a protocol
which gives the respondents plausible deniability, meaning
that an analyst cannot tell if a given respondent lied or not












Fig. 2: Randomized response, in this example following the
protocol to answer the question “Do you text and drive?”
Randomized response enforces local differential privacy,
and each driver follows the protocol in Figure 2 in order to
respond under differential privacy. In order to interpret the
results from randomized response, the analyst has to extract
the number of people that where telling the truth using Bayes’
theorem.
IV. PRIVACY GUARANTEES
In order to utilize the privacy budget well, making it last
longer than when using a naı̈ve approach, privacy can be
applied at event-level [20] rather than user-level. Event-level
privacy protects a single event, such as a single data point
where a driver is speeding, whereas user-level privacy typically
protects an individual or an object such as a vehicle. The
analyst defines what an event is, for example a reading of
one single signal or something that happens after a certain
condition is met. For example, one event might be that the
airbag has been triggered, but it could also be one single
reading of the engine temperature.
Essentially, the privacy level determines what or who should
be protected by differential privacy, by determining what data
points are considered to belong to one entity. In other words, if
we choose user-level privacy for a car, all 7700 signals belong
to that entity, whereas if we decide on event-level privacy, we
can decide on a subset of those signals.
V. ADVICE
In theory, any query can be answered under differential
privacy. In practice, however, some queries are better suited,
since they offer a better trade-off between privacy and utility.
Hence, in this section we will present some advice regarding
how to proceed when creating a differentially private analysis
for vehicular data.
A. Model the Domain
1) Decide the privacy level: Before starting to implement
anything, it is important to define who or what privacy should
be provided for. For example, if the driver’s identity should
be protected, user-level privacy needs to be used. Also, since
a driver can drive more than one vehicle, this needs to be
accounted for in the model.
In some cases, to improve the utility of the answer, the
analyst might settle for only hiding certain events, such as
speeding, in which case the analyst can choose to only provide
privacy for the speed of the car. On the other hand, the analyst
can also choose to hide only the time a driver was driving at
a certain speed. In the case where only the time is hidden,
the driver can deny that he or she was speeding since it is
impossible to infer where the driver was driving. In other
words, an analyst can choose to hide events of different sizes,
such as only the time something happened or an entire driving
pattern, and it is vital to define in advance what those events
are.
Thus, modeling the kind of privacy that should be given and
to whom needs to be done first, in order to decide the privacy
level as well as finding a suitable value for ǫ.
B. Trusted Party or Not?
1) Decide deployment mode: The main advantage of local
differential privacy is that each driver adds their own noise,
as opposed to centralized differential privacy. Thus, local
differential privacy, which can be implemented using random-
ized response, is carried out on-board whereas centralized
differential privacy must be implemented off-board. Since
randomized response is local, no trusted party is needed to
gather all data, which also means companies never have to
store or even get in contact with any sensitive data as it will
be kept in the vehicle. Furthermore, on-board algorithms can
also result in data minimization, meaning that less data is
gathered from the driver, which is a property that is being
promoted by the upcoming GDPR. However, the downside
of local mechanisms is that achieving an adequate trade-off
between privacy and utility is difficult in real-world cases [21].
C. Using the Privacy Budget
In order to get a good balance between utility and privacy,
the privacy budget needs to be used with care. We believe
there are certain techniques that could make the budget last
longer, such as personalized budgets [22] (as opposed to a
global budget) and random sampling.
1) Personalized budgets: First, personalized budgets for
differential privacy allows each record to keep its own budget,
which means all records are not affected by queries that do
not concern them. Using personalized budgets thus allows an
analyst to keep the budget from being spent unnecessary, as
he or she can query all vehicles of a certain model without
also spending the budget for vehicles of other models.
From a data management perspective, another benefit of
using personalized budgets is that even if there is no cen-
trally controlled database gathering all the data, deductions
to a global budget do not have to be communicated across
databases as long as all data belonging to one entity remains in
one database. Thus, a company can still keep several databases
for different kinds of data without introducing dependencies
between the databases.
2) Random sampling: Secondly, random sampling allows
us to select a subset of records to query, and thus together
with personalized budgets only spend the budget of that subset.
Random sampling is especially appealing for big data sets,
where a subset of the entire population still gives a good
prediction. We believe that vehicular data fits this description.
3) Streaming data: Furthermore, we also believe the vehi-
cle industry could benefit from enforcing differential privacy
on streaming data instead of storing raw data in an off-board
database, as all stored data would be sanitized. That is, vehicles
could be selected to be part of a query, and then their replies
could be released under differential privacy where the data
is aggregated. In this way only the results from differentially
private queries could be saved, and raw data thrown away.
Since differential privacy offers post-processing, the data kept
could then be used in any analysis. Apart from preserving
privacy, this approach could also save storage space on the
server side, and could also decrease the traffic used to upload
data when queries only are issued on demand.
In the case of the streaming paradigm where vehicles are
queried, each vehicle would have to keep track of its own
budget and communicate it to the server, which would be
possible when we use personalized budgets. Even though local
differential privacy inherently is better suited for this setting,
we believe this provides an alternative where local algorithms
offer low utility.
D. Population Statistics, Never Individual Data
Differential privacy is designed to answer statistical queries
that make predictions about the population, not for inferring
information about individuals. Thus, if an analyst were to ask
how often Bob uses the parking brake per week, the result
would not be useful as the noise would likely be too high.
The accuracy of results can be vital if safety-critical func-
tionality is to be developed from an analysis. In such cases,
the upper-bound and lower-bound accuracy of a differentially
private algorithm needs to be calculated before the analysis
is carried out. If the differentially private algorithm does not
provide a tight upper- and lower-bound on accuracy, the safety-
critical functionality could be at risk by using data under
differential privacy.
In these cases, there are two options: either the differentially
private algorithm is modified (for example by rephrasing the
query, see Section V-E) to achieve higher accuracy, or the
analysis is carried out without guaranteeing differential privacy
on the company’s own vehicles. For example, a case where
differential privacy is not suitable is for function testing using
high-resolution data from few vehicles.
E. Rephrase Queries
Rephrasing a query might result in better utility.
1) Target the population: In some cases an inappropriate
query, that targets individuals, can be rephrased into a query
that targets the entire population. For example, if we want to
find out when an engine is running outside of its specification,
asking for in which vehicles this occurs would be a bad idea.
On the other hand, what we are really interested in might not
be which those cars are, but rather how many they are, to
determine if it is common or not. In such a case it is possible
to turn a bad query into a prediction about the population,
a counting query in this case, which would provide a better
answer to, approximately, the original query.
2) Change the query type: In other cases, the problem
might not be that one individual is targeted, but that the query
itself is prone to result in high noise. As an example, instead
of asking for the average speed, the speed can be investigated
from a histogram from which heavy-hitters can be identified.
In other words, when the query sensitivity is high, transform-
ing the query into a less noisy one is advisable, unless the
difference between the query result and the proportional noise
is small.
F. Dealing with Query Sensitivity
One issue with query sensitivity is that in practice it can be
hard to define. Therefore, in some cases, the query sensitivity
needs to be set to the physical maximum of a parameter, which
is unlikely but necessary.
1) Query a large data set: Some queries, such as sums and
averages, tend to have high query sensitivity. For vehicles, the
analyst might then when defining the query sensitivity refer
to the maximum value that can be held in a certain register
in the vehicle. While these queries can still be used, the noise
will be easier to hide when a larger data set is queried. Thus,
the data set’s size is more important in cases where the query
sensitivity is high rather than in cases where it is constant,
such as counting queries and histograms.
2) Fixed sensitivity through cropped ranges: The way we
suggest for dealing with high query sensitivity is to crop the
ranges and set a fixed max and min value. All values outside
of range must not be used in the analysis, as they would not
be protected in this case. The chosen range itself also leaks
information about what range is expected to be normal. When
the range itself is sensitive data, the range must be decided
under differential privacy.
However, if the range is not well-known, it is possible to
accidentally set the range to an interval which a large part of
the values fall outside of. To be able tweak an incorrectly set
range in a differentially private manner, we suggest creating
one bin on each side of the range that catches all outside
values. When the side-bins are fuller than a certain threshold,
it indicates a problem with the chosen range, which then needs
to be redefined.
G. Applicable Analyses
1) Histograms and counting queries: Histograms and
counting queries are particularly suited for the Laplace mecha-
nism, as pointed out by Dwork [23]. The reason for this is that
histograms and counting queries have a fixed sensitivity, which
generally results in low noise that is independent of the data
set’s size. Consequently, when the data set queried is small,
histogram and counting queries are especially appropriate.
2) Numerical queries: Any other numerical query is also
possible to implement under differential privacy using the
Laplace mechanism. However, the Laplace mechanism is
highly dependent on the type of query being asked, as each
query type has its own sensitivity, ∆f . For example, if we
want to calculate the average speed of a vehicle, we need to
account for the largest possible change adding or removing any
data point to the set can have on the average. Consequently,
we must assume the worst case, which in this case is adding
the highest possible speed to the data set. Thus, the sensitivity
is the difference between the maximum and minimum speed
possible. The sensitivity will then affect the proportion of noise
that is added to the query result, and thus we suggest choosing
a query which has lower sensitivity as it generally will yield
lower noise than a high sensitivity query.
3) Categorical queries: For data where adding noise makes
little sense, such as categorical data, the exponential mecha-
nism can be used. One such example is when asking for the
most popular car colors, as adding numerical noise to colors
does not make sense. Another example would be if we want
to find out what button on the dashboard is pushed the most
times.
VI. CHALLENGES
There are many challenges with properly implementing
a differentially private analysis in real-world cases. In this
section we point out some of the most prominent ones for
vehicular data.
A. Setting the Privacy Budget
To reason about ǫ, the domain must first be modeled in
such a way that the entity to protect has been defined through
setting the privacy level. ǫ is then the factor of indistinguisha-
bility between any two entities. Consequently, setting ǫ to a
meaningful value is difficult, as ǫ is a relative measure of
privacy risk [24]. In other words, the appropriate value of ǫ
is affected by the type of data being released. Thus, the risk
of two differentially private algorithms cannot be compared
by their value of ǫ. This problem is not unique to vehicular
data, but follows inherently from the definition of differential
privacy.
While how to choose ǫ appropriately remains an open
research question, Lee and Clifton as well as Hsu et al. pro-
pose practical solutions to the problem. Lee and Clifton
suggests choosing ǫ based on the individual’s risk of being
re-identified [24], whereas Hsu et al. [25] propose that ǫ
should be chosen based on an economic model. While no
approach is clearly better than the other, both solutions provide
an interpretation of what the privacy guarantees mean to
a participant, making it possible to communicate the risk
accordingly.
B. Multidimensional Time Series Data
Compared to other systems, preserving the privacy of ve-
hicles is particularly difficult since they are highly complex
systems that generates vast amounts of data from thousands
of signals. To make matters worse, vehicle signals can be
gathered continuously over time. Consequently, as the amount
of available data simplifies identifying a particular vehicle,
hiding the presence of a specific vehicle in the data set
becomes more difficult than hiding fewer connected data
points.
Because of the multidimensional time series nature of the
data, performing more than one analysis with high utility that
guarantees user-level privacy becomes infeasible. User-level
privacy would also not allow the analyst to reset the budget,
not even after years of using the same budget. Consequently,
we believe that in order to maintain utility, analyses can only
provide event-level privacy.
On a positive note, providing event-level privacy can save
the manufacturer the trouble of maintaining the privacy budget
between different systems, as it results in separate privacy
budgets for each system.
An open issue that we need to solve in this area is
interpreting what event-level differential privacy means for a
driver, as it is an individual that ultimately wants the privacy.
For example, what does it mean from a privacy perspective if
we only hide at what point in time the battery had a certain
temperature? Event-level privacy might be more feasible than
user-level privacy from a utility perspective, but every case
must be investigated to make sure the privacy guarantees in
such a situation makes sense to an individual as well.
VII. CONCLUSION
For vehicular data, differential privacy can be especially
tricky to enforce due to the fact that vehicles contain a
system of thousands of dependent signals collected over time.
Consequently, the automotive domain is very complex from a
privacy perspective. However, as differential privacy is the only
privacy model that provides provable privacy guarantees, this
is currently the only robust way of mitigating re-identification
attacks on data while maintaining utility. Thus, we believe that
the automotive industry will benefit from carrying out their
privacy-preserving analyses under differential privacy.
In order to properly implement differential privacy, it is vital
that the company first model the privacy within their domain,
to determine what they are trying to protect. From the model,
the company can then define what signals an event should
consist of, and the model also makes it possible to reason
about a suitable value for ǫ. Only after the modeling has been
done can the implementation details of the analysis be decided.
Differential privacy should be used to answer statistical
questions about a population. Since differential privacy aims to
protect the privacy of each entity, it is not suitable for detecting
anomalies. Because of this, analyses on high-resolution data
from few vehicles, such as when performing function testing,
should not be carried out under differential privacy. Any other
statistical queries can be answered under differential privacy,
but we believe that one of the main problems with introducing
differential privacy in the automotive domain is maintaining
high utility for the analyses. Thus, we have investigated ways
of being able to spend the privacy budget wisely.
We believe that in order to enforce differential privacy for
vehicular data in a sustainable way, personalized budgets,
random sampling as well as event-level privacy are key to
high utility. Rephrasing queries as well as cropping ranges of
queries is also something that can make differential privacy
more applicable. Furthermore, we believe that by issuing
queries to vehicles on the go using the streaming paradigm
or local differential privacy, there is potential to save both
storage space and bandwidth while preserving privacy at the
same time.
In the end, we believe differential privacy shows promise
for the vehicle industry. However, more work still needs to be
put into interpreting the meaning of ǫ as well as event-level
privacy from a customer’s perspective, as the meaning will
differ on a case-by-case basis.
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